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ABSTRACT
Increasing research in ubiquitous computing techniques to-
wards the development of an Ambient Intelligence raises is-
sues regarding privacy. To gain the required data needed to
enable application in this Ambient Intelligence to offer smart
services to users, sensors will monitor users’ behavior to fill
personal context histories. Those context histories will be
stored on database/information systems which we consider
as honest: they can be trusted now, but might be subject to
attacks in the future. Making this assumption implies that
protecting context histories by means of access control might
be not enough. To reduce the impact of possible attacks,
we propose to use limited retention techniques. In our ap-
proach, we present applications a degraded set of data with
a retention delay attached to it which matches both appli-
cation requirements and users privacy wishes. Data degra-
dation can be twofold: the accuracy of context data can
be lowered such that the less privacy sensitive parts are re-
tained, and context data can be transformed such that only
particular abilities for application remain available. Reten-
tion periods can be specified to trigger irreversible removal
of the context data from the system.
General Terms
Security, Algorithms
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1. INTRODUCTION
Since many years, much research has been done in the field of
‘Ambient Intelligence’. Although some definitions are avail-
able [17], it is still hard to capture the term ‘Ambient Intel-
ligence’ in a clear definition. It is easier to define Ambient
Intelligence by giving characteristics of it, like ‘it consists
of a pervasive network of intelligent devices that will coop-
eratively gather, process and transport information’ [25, 11],
or in other words: it consists of a collection of ubiquitous
computing techniques. Combine this property with the fol-
lowing and you get an impression of what a smart Ambient
Intelligence stands for: AmI uses new forms of natural inter-
action with users in order to ‘let people live easily in digital
environments in which the electronics are sensitive to peo-
ple’s needs, personalized to their requirements, anticipatory
of their behavior and responsive to their presence‘ [24]. This
means that Ambient Intelligence will be everywhere, invis-
ible, will use powerful sensing capabilities and most of all
needs a memory [19] in the form of context histories to be
able to easy peoples’ life in making automatic decisions [22].
An important side effect of Ambient Intelligence is, that a
smart, anticipating and learning environment will have a
great impact on privacy. One of the main difficulties with
privacy in the ubiquitous computing, is the way how data is
collected. Ubiquitous computing techniques, such as small
sensors, active (RFID) badges or cameras equipped with
powerful image recognizing algorithms, often collect data
when people are not aware of it [18]. In that case it is pos-
sible that people could have a comfortable feeling of safety
(e.g., when they are in a closed private area such as coffee
rooms), but in reality they could be monitored by sensors
without being aware of it. This leads to asymmetric informa-
tion: the owner of the data (the donor) has less information
than the collector of the data [18]. Xiaodong et al state that
the presence of asymmetric information is the heart of the
information privacy problem in ubiquitous computing. In
environments with significant asymmetry between the in-
formation knowledge of donor and collector, negative side
effects as privacy violations are much harder to overcome.
Several techniques have been proposed which let donors of
the data specify privacy policies, in order to give control of
their data to the owners of that data [28, 6]. Although such
policies are rich enough and very useful to let users control
who, when, how long and what kind of information can be
disclosed to specific applications, enforcing those policies is
managed by access control. As stated by Agrawal et al [1],
limited retention and limited collection techniques (such as
to some extend applied in P3P [28]) are highly desirable to
prevent large collections of context histories to be disclosed
at times when access control fails to resist against attacks
on the database system, human mistakes or even malicious
database administrators [13].
Companies providing smart services will have an interest in
protecting the privacy of their customers in order to keep
their market segment. They can not take the risk of vi-
olating users’ privacy on purpose, and besides that they
are pushed by the law to protect the privacy of their cus-
tomers [12]. This means that servers storing context histo-
ries used by those companies can be considered as honest :
they do their best effort to protect their content and are
not voluntarily malicious. In practice however, most of such
servers are eventually subject to attacks from the outside
and so can not be trusted forever [8]. Using database/net-
work IDS (Intrusion Detection Systems), the state of an
information system in practice can be viewed over time as
followed: periods of normal behavior without attacks and
problems are interrupted by attacks. With such a behavior,
protecting information by means of access control might be
not enough. Indeed, when the system is under attack, all
data can be stolen and be disclosed. With a retention model,
we benefit from the periods of ‘normal behavior’ to remove
useless data and limit the impact of next attacks. The im-
pact is even more limited with limited collection, since only
data for which consent has been given will be stored. Only
relying on access control mechanisms to protect against not
allowed disclosure of data, is in terms of privacy protection
not sufficient enough [1, 16].
1.1 Contribution
The main problem as presented in this paper is how to pro-
vide limited retention and limited collection. We recall the
definitions of those two principles as stated by Agrawal as
principles for an Hippocratic Database [1]:
• Limited Collection: The personal information collected
shall be limited to the minimum necessary accomplish-
ing the specified purposes.
• Limited Retention: Personal information shall be re-
tained only as long as necessary for the fulfillment of
the purposes for which it has been collected.
For particular, mostly static databases containing large datasets
with privacy sensitive data (like medical data), anonymiza-
tion can be used as a limited retention mechanism to pre-
vent disclosure of individual privacy sensitive data [27, 26,
21, 7]. Regarding the Ambient Intelligence, this is a limited
solution since anonymization gives not always adequate pri-
vacy protection for everyone, and the usability of the data
becomes sometimes lower than needed because individual
privacy concerns and personal interests are not taken into
account. Xiao et al [30] recognize this problem and pro-
pose to personalize the anonymization of privacy sensitive
data. However, to present real, irreversible privacy protec-
tion through anonymization or noise insertion leads often to
an unacceptable loss of usability regarding smartness for the
Ambient Intelligence.
Server side encryption methods can be used to protect data
disclosure, but, as with access control, we can not trust the
server forever. Hence, in this case encryption is not a solu-
tion.
The nature of data used in the Ambient Intelligence and
smart environments is different and more dynamic than tra-
ditional static data. The amount of smartness of applica-
tions is bound to the quantity and quality of the data they
can use. How more accurate the data, and how more data
has been gathered from a certain individual, the better a
smart application can learn from that data without user in-
teraction [10]. How privacy sensitive certain data (for exam-
ple: location data) is, depends partially on time. For some
people, it is acceptable that their current location is visi-
ble for everyone, but not acceptable that people can track
their whole path in history. Perhaps they find it less privacy
sensitive if the exact time stamps belonging to their past lo-
cations are degraded to a less accuracy level, or that their
exact location is degraded to the area in which they were.
Our target is to find the best balance between the quality
and quantity of data at the one side, and the privacy sen-
sitivity of the data otherwise by retaining only that data
necessary to fulfill applications purposes.
Our contribution is therefor twofold:
1. We provide means to degrade and transform data in or-
der to collect and retain only that information needed
for each individual application to supply their services
to the users. Given specified retention period(s), data
is only retained in a specific form as long the user gives
consent for it.
2. By clearly stating which information is needed and will
be stored for how long, users are in control over their
data, decreasing the impact of the asymmetric infor-
mation problems.
The organization of this paper will be as followed. First we
present an introduction into techniques for degrading the
accuracy of data values specified by life-cycle policies. Af-
ter this we introduce the notice of degrading abilities by
means of data transformation. We conclude with combin-
ing the introduced techniques into application oriented data
degradation, such that each application will have access to a
materialized view which contains only that data authorized
by the users to this application.
2. VALUE DEGRADATION
One way to make data less privacy sensitive is to general-
ize the data to make the data less accurate. By removing
parts of the data (e.g., the minutes part from a time value),
less data is retained increasing privacy in trade of decreas-
ing usability. However, for some services full accuracy is
not required, making degradation acceptable for those ap-
plications. Besides that, using value degradation as an fine
grained limited retention strategy means that not all data
needs to be destroyed after a retention period, making more
data available for application while still complying to users’
privacy wishes. This can be done in multiple degradation
steps.
In this section we provide a formalization of value degrada-
tion specified by a life-cycle policies [2, 29]. For simplicity,
we model data as n-tuples (e.g: time, person, context, . . .)
which can take values in context states, exhibiting a cer-
tain level of accuracy specified in a domain generalization
graph [15, 27] of that attribute. The generalization graphs
form together a cube (see figure 1 in which we show three
context dimensions time, id and location), in which each di-
mension represents the accuracy of an attribute of the orig-
inal data triplet. A Life-Cycle Policy is a set of transitions
between elements (states) of this cube and the events which
trigger the transitions.
To be precise, we define a LCP as:
LCP = (S,Σ, δ, s0, sf ) (1)
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Figure 1: The different domain generalization graphs
together form a cube. A Life-Cycle Policy is a set of
transitions between elements (states) of this cube and
the events which trigger the transitions.
where S is a set of context states written as triplets (t, id, l)
(∅ is used to denote the ‘removal state’), Σ a set of events,
δ a set of transition functions S ×Σ→ S, s0 the start state
(also called the construction state) and sf the final state of
the degradation process, where sf = {∅} indicates removal
of the context data from the system. For example:
S = {s0, s1, s2, sf} = {(sec, id, url), (hour, group, url)
, (hour, uni, category), ∅}
Σ = {t0, t1, t2} = {after 1 hour, after 1 month, after 1 year}
δ(s0, t0) = s1
δ(s1, t1) = s2
δ(s2, t2) = sf
A LCP can be represented by a labeled directed acyclic graph.
The nodes of such graph are elements of the set of states Q,
the labels are elements of Σ, in such way that an arc from
si to sj is labeled a if sj = δ(si, a). A DAG of the LCP of
above example is given in figure 2. Also the arrows in figure 1
illustrate transitions between context states corresponding
to a (different) LCP.
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Figure 2: Example of a degradation policy noted as a
DFA
3. DEGRADATION OF ABILITIES
In stead of only facilitating natural degradation of values,
we also want to support functional degradation of abilities.
In this section we show that traditional database operators
(e.g., select, project, join) can be disabled by means of data
degradation in opposite to traditional access control tech-
niques (like simply disabling the operators given specified
access rights).
To motivate this approach, we slightly enhance the defini-
tion of context data:
Context data = event + link to the real world
Context data = event + {time, location, id, . . .}
Context data = ‘door opened’ + {10:33, 3090, Peter, . . .}
Events alone (without additional context information) are
not particularly privacy sensitive, but even without addi-
tional information they can be useful for application. For
example, the number of times the windows are opened in
a building can be an indication for the effectiveness of the
climate control mechanisms in that building. With addi-
tional context information, like the time and location of an
event, both the usability and privacy sensitivity of the data
increases.
Each additional dimension of context information brings it
own additional usage of the data. Although we concentrate
in this paper only on SPJ-queries (select-project-join), we
list here some abilities of the time dimension:
• stick-ability ⇒ absolute time knowledge (e.g., 2006-09-
05 14:00:45)
– Time is a universal dimension, enables to ‘stick’
the event on the universal time axis, making it
possible to ‘select on time’ and ‘project time’.
Example:
select event , time
from f a c t s
where time > 2006−09−22
• group-ability ⇒ “context” knowledge (e.g., month, evening,
. . .)
– Exact time is replaced by “contextual” value, en-
ables to perform ‘group by’ and ‘select on context’
queries without knowing the exact date an event
happened.
Example:
select count ( event ) , time as context
from f a c t s
group by time
• join-ability ⇒ concurrent event knowledge (e.g., time
represented by a join key)”
– Discover concomitant events (even among differ-
ent AmI spaces or ContextDBs), enables the join
operator in queries without disclosing the exact
time.
Example:
select event
from f a c t s f1 , f a c t s f 2
where f 1 . time = f2 . time
• order-ability ⇒ time as a sequence number (e.g., 1, 2,
3, 8, 12)
– Keep ordering between events, predict next events
to occur, enables the order by operator.
Example:
select event
from f a c t s
order by time
With the stick ability, time is simply stored as a time stamp
linked to the event description. Since this attribute is avail-
able, the sort, group by, and all relevant operators make
sense in SQL queries. Our goal is to degrade the stick abil-
ity to one or more other abilities by degrading the time value.
The set of SQL operators is then still available, but they do
not have any use anymore (a ‘group by’ on sequence numbers
is not useful). We can do similar things with the location
and time dimensions. The abilities formed by all dimension
can be combined.
3.1 Formalization
As mentioned before, we will only focus on SPJ-queries. To
start with the most simple queries, we show that for queries
using only the join, select or project operator in isolation,
it is possible to find an alternative query on degraded data
which returns the same result as the original query (e.g., we
show adequacy). We start to give a formal description of
the notion of adequacy
3.1.1 Adequacy
The goal of degrading data is, that applications, given a pre-
defined query, still can use this degraded data to answer the
query. Since degraded data contains less information than
the not degraded data, this data is less privacy sensitive. To
ensure that the application still retrieves correct and com-
plete answers (the result contains no false answers and the
result contains all true answers), a degraded database must
be adequate:
Definition 1. Given a predefined query Q and a set of re-
lations {R}, a degraded database V ({R}) is adequate (with
respect to Q) if there is a query Q′ such that Q({R}) =
Q′(V ({R})) (see Figure 3).
Note: if we speak about a set of queries for which one de-
graded database V ({R}) will be used, than the degraded
database V ({R}) is adequate if ∀Q ∈ {Q0, Q1, . . . , Qn}∃Q′ :
Q({R}) = Q′(V ({R})).
3.1.2 Project operator
Given the query pi{x,z}(R) on a relation R(x, y, z, u), a de-
graded database Vpi{x,z} can be found by removing the at-
tributes /∈ {x, z}:
pi pi
x y z u
1 2 3 4
5 6 7 8
9 10 11 12
13 14 15 16
=
Db(original)
Db’ (degraded)
Q0
Q’0
V
I0
I’0
I1
I’1
In
I’n
Figure 3: After n inserts I in the original database,
a query Q on this data should return the same result
as an alternative query Q′ on n degraded inserts I ′.
Definition 2. Degradation for the project list {x, y} is de-
fined as:
Vpi{x,y} ({(x1, y1, z1, u1) , . . . , (xn, yn, zn, un)})
=
{(x, y, z, u, ) : {(x1, y1, z1, u1) , . . . , (xn, yn, zn, un)} • {x, z}}
Hence, all columns from the table which are not touched by
the query can simply be removed, since they play not a role
in answering the query.
3.1.3 Select operator
Given the query σC(y)(R) on a relationR (with C(y) a condi-
tion applying to attribute y), a degraded database VσC(y)(R)
can be found by simply removing all tuples for which C(y) ==
false:
σ
x y z u
1 2 3 4
5 6 7 8
9 10 11 12
13 14 15 16
Constant operand. For now, we assume that select condi-
tions have the form x⊗ c, using an operator ⊗ ∈ {<,>,=}
. In some conditions, c is a constant (like a constant time
value or location). If the operand is a constant, a value x
which is tested against c using the operator will always re-
turn the same result. If x ⊗ c is false now, it also will be
in the future, and thus will never be in the result set of the
query.
Definition 3. A tuple (x, y, z, . . .) is considered as forever
false with respect to x and a constant c, if the expression
evaluates to false at insertion time.
Similar to forever false, tuples could be forever true.
The degradation function VσC(y) , given a query Q using op-
erator ⊗ on attribute A and constant c, can be specified as:
if for a tuple t ∈ R(. . . , A, . . .) : x ⊗ c == false, with x ∈ t
an instance of A, tuple t will not be stored in the degraded
database.
Definition 4. Degradation for a select condition C with
constant operand c on attribute x is defined as:
VσC(y) ({(x1, y1, z1, u1) , . . . , (xn, yn, zn, un)})
=
{(x, y, z, u, ) : {(x1, y1, z1, u1) , . . . , (xn, yn, zn, un)}
|x⊗ c • {x, y, z, u}}
Variable operand. In some queries, the select condition
uses a variable operand whose value may change over time.
This may result in the fact that some tuples can be true
now, but are false in the future.
Example: C(time) = time < now()− 1 hour
At insertion time, above expression will evaluated to true.
After one hour however, the expression would evaluate to
false. To handle this ‘true now false in the future’ condition
we can again remove the tuples which are false at insertion
time. The tuples which are true at insertion time will be
inserted in the database. Through ‘lazy evaluation’ at query
time, we can remove the tuples which have become false.
Example: C(time) = time > now()− 1 hour
At insertion time, above expression will evaluate to false and
will for a certain amount of time not be part of the query
result. This tuple is thus not needed for the degraded data
set to be adequate and should be removed. However, to be
still adequate in the future, the tuple should be inserted in
the degraded data set when the expression would evaluate
to true. Additional techniques (like access control, secure
hardware or distributed protocols) might be used to tackle
this problem.
3.1.4 Join operator
Given the queryR 1u R on a relationR, a degraded database
V1u can be found by replacing u with an irreversible join
key which can be used to make the join on the (generalized)
representation of value u.
1 1key
x y z u ukey
1 2 3 4 a
5 6 7 8 b
9 10 11 12 c
13 14 15 16 d
Definition 5. There is a function fk : X → X ′ which
is injective with respect to k, that is, f(a) =k f(b) implies
a =k b (or a =k b implies f(a) =k f(b), for any a, b ∈ X such
that for all relations (denoted as n-tuples) the degradation
function V1u is defined as:
V1u ({(x1, y1, z1, u1) , . . . , (xn, yn, zn, un)})
=
{(x1, y1, z1, fk(u1)) , . . . , (xn, yn, zn, fk(un))}
where y is the to be degraded component. The injective
function f must replace the real value of the join attribute
(the to be degraded attribute) with a join key. Predicate
k defines for which generalization of that attribute the join
key must be generated (and thus to which extend fk must
be injective).
With respect to privacy, generation of a join key should hap-
pen in such a way that it is computational hard to obtain
x from y if f(x) = y. To enforce this last property on a
finite domain X, a one-way key hash function can be used,
for which the key is kept secret. Note however that a hash
function by definition is not an infinite function, although
(when used properly in practical situations) it can be as-
sumed to be a near injective function, with low chance of
duplicate hash values. Other possibilities are using block
encryption [23], other forms of access control or distributed
key-sharing protocols [9].
3.2 Degradation of data for a SPJ-query
In the previous sections we showed that for single operators
it is possible to provide a degradation function which trans-
forms the data such that only that information is kept which
is necessary to answer the query adequate now and in the
future. In this section we show that those techniques can
be combined to provide a degraded data set of any select-
project-join query. We make the assumption here that there
are methods to store and process the ‘true now false in the
future’, ‘false now true in the future’ and join keys.
pi σ pi 1 1key
x y z u ukey
1 2 3 4 a
5 6 7 8 b
9 10 11 12 c
13 14 15 16 d
Definition 6. For a single SPJ-query piX
 
σC(y) (R 1u R)

a degraded data set can be obtained by creating a composi-
tion function VpiX ◦ V1u ◦ VσC(y)(R).
3.2.1 Proof of adequacy
Given the definition of degradation functions for select, project
and join, we provide a simple proof that the composition of
those functions provide an adequate set of degraded data.
For simplicity, we assume that select condition C uses a
constant operand.
The target in the following proof is to find an alternative
query Q′ on the degraded data which produces the same
result as a query Q on the original data. We start with query
Q, in which k is an generalization function as described in
the previous section1:
pi{x,z}
 
σC(y)
 
R 1k(u) R

This query can be rewritten as:
pi{x,z}
 
σC(y)(R) 1k(u) σC(y)(R)

1We use the notation a =k b as an abbreviation of k(a) =
k(b) and fk(a) as an abbreviation of f ◦ k(a)
The select condition can be rewritten using set notation
which results in:
pi{x,z}{(x, y, z, u) : R|C(y) == true
• {x, y, z, u}} 1k(u) σC(y)(R)
Indeed, this set notation is equal to the definition of VσC(y) :
pi{x′,z′}({(x′, y′, z′, u′) : VσC(y) (R)
• {x′, y′, z′, u′}} 1u′=ku σC(y)(R))
We therefore can replace the join on data with the select
condition on the original data, with a join on the degraded
data:
pi{x′,z′}

VσC(y) (R) 1k(u′) VσC(y) (R)

Now we rewrite the join using set notation:
pi{x′0,z′0}({
 
x′0, y
′
0, z
′
0, u
′
0

: VσC(y) (R),
 
x′1, y
′
1, z
′
1, u
′
1

: VσC(y) (R)
|u′0 =k u′1 • {x′0, y′0, z′0, u′0, x′1, y′1, z′1, u′1}})
Given that an injective function fk is used to generate a
key, the following set comprehension will produce the same
result:
pi{x′0,z′0}({
 
x′0, y
′
0, z
′
0, u
′
0

: VσC(y) (R),
 
x′1, y
′
1, z
′
1, u
′
1

: VσC(y) (R)
|fk(u′0) == fk(u′1) • {x′0, y′0, z′0, u′0, x′1, y′1, z′1, u′1}})
Again, this is equal to the definition of the degradation func-
tion for joins:
pi{x′′0 ,z′′0 }({
 
x′′0 , y
′′
0 , z
′′
0 , u
′′
0

: V1k(u′) (VσC(y) (R)), 
x′′1 , y
′′
1 , z
′′
1 , u
′′
1

: V1k(u′) (VσC(y) (R))
|u′′0 == u′′1 ) • {x′′0 , y′′0 , z′′0 , u′′0 , x′′1 , y′′1 , z′′1 , u′′1}})
We can replace the join on the original data with a join on
the degraded data:
pi{x′′0 ,z′′0 }

V1k(u′) (VσC(y) (R)) 1k(u′′) V1k(u′) (VσC(y) (R))

Now we have to rewrite the projection on the set {x, z}:
{{x′′0 , y′′0 , z′′0 , u′′0 , x′′1 , y′′1 , z′′1 , u′′1} :
V1k(u′) (VσC(y) (R)) 1k(u′′) V1k(u′) (VσC(y) (R))

• {x′′0 , z′′0 }}
This results in alternative query on degraded data using the
defined degradation functions:
pi∗(Vpi{x′′0 ,z′′0 }
(V1k(u′)(VσC(y)(R))
1k(u′′) V1k(u′)(VσC(y)(R))))
2
4. APPLICATION ORIENTED DEGRADA-
TION
Now we have the techniques to degrade and transform the
data in order to make the data less privacy sensitive, we can
use them in policies in which can be specified to what form
the data must be stored and how long it must be retained.
In this context, application can communicate their require-
ments by queries on the data (we assume that it is known
which data is available from the sensors in the AmI-space).
After degrading and transforming the data in such way that
only that information remains such that the queries still can
be answered, it can be up to the donors of the data (e.g., the
users of the applications) to give their consent and to specify
until how long their data may be retained in the system.
To clarify this, see the example given in figure 4. Here
we have a base relation R(id,location,time), that is, tuples
select group
from facts
where building = ‘A’
select f1.id, f2.id, f1.room
from facts f1, facts f2
where f1.building = ‘B’
and f1.hour = f2.hour
select hour
from facts
where building = ‘C’
and group = ‘DB’
R(id,location,time)
d=1monthd=1 month
d=1 day
Figure 4: Three queries are specified on a rela-
tion R(id,location,time) and retention periods δ after
which the data should be removed such that it will not
be part of the query answer anymore.
are coming in from sensors with accurate ids of persons be-
ing monitored, the exact location and time (the monitored
events themselves are left out of consideration in this exam-
ple). Applications using this data want to have the ability
to know which groups (that is, at least one person from a
group) have entered a particular building (Q1), they want
to know which pairs of persons where in a particular build-
ing within the same hour and in which room (Q2) and they
want to have the ability to know in which hour(s) a member
of a particular group has entered a building (Q3).
For these queries to be answered, it is not necessary to store
and keep all data accurate and privacy sensitive, so we are
looking for degraded sets of data which still can answer the
queries adequate, but are less privacy sensitive. To do this
we first create out of base relation R three sets of data
{R1, R2, R3} which can answer Q1, Q2 and Q3:
R1{id, location, time}
R2{id, location, time}
R3{id, location, time}
For each set we give a degradation function:
R′1 = V1(R) = Vpi{id} ◦ Vσbuilding=A (R)
R′2 = V2(R) = Vpi{id,id,loc} ◦ Vσbuilding=B ◦ V1hour(time) (R)
R′3 = V3(R) = Vpi{time} ◦ Vσbuilding=C∧group=DB (R)
This results in the following relations:
R′1{id}
R′2{id, id, location, time key}
R′3{time}
The attributes in those relations are more accurate than
required by the queries. We use here the techniques as de-
scribed in section 2 to degrade these values and attach a
retention delay to it after which the values will finally be
removed from the system. Those life cycle policies are now
relative simple:
S1 = {s1} = {(group, ∅, ∅)}
S2 = {s2} = {(id, id, room, time key)}
S3 = {s3} = {(∅, ∅, hour)}
Σ1 = {t1} = {after 1 month}
Σ2 = {t1} = {after 1 month}
Σ3 = {t2} = {after 1 day}
lcp1 = {S1,Σ1, {δ (s1, t1) = ∅}, s1, ∅}
lcp2 = {S2,Σ2, {δ (s2, t1) = ∅}, s2, ∅}
lcp3 = {S3,Σ3, {δ (s3, t2) = ∅}, s3, ∅}
Finally, this results in the following sets which will be avail-
able for querying:
R′′1{group}
R′′2{id, id, room, time key}}
R′′3{hour}
The only thing left is, that we need to specify the (triv-
ial) alternative queries Q′1,Q
′
2 and Q
′
2 on the degraded data
which should return the same results as the original queries
on relation R:
Q′1 = select group from R
′′
1
Q′2 = select id1, id2, room from R
′′
2 r1, R
′′
2 r2
where r1.time key = r2.time key
Q′3 = select time from R
′′
3
4.1 Performance issues for updating materi-
alized views
To some extent, degrading the base relation into a sets of
degraded data is similar to creating materialized views from
the base relation. Much previous research has been done
on ‘maintaining materialized views’, of which the most deal
with the relevancy of updates for the view, that is, is (for
example) an insert independent of the query for which the
view has been build [3]. According to Gupta et al [14], when
there is only partial or no information (there is no base rela-
tion from which the view can be recalculated), those ’query
independent of update’ algorithms [3, 4] can determine if
the view needs to be updated and if so, some algorithm
can be used for that. Those kinds of views are called self-
maintainable views.
In the context of our privacy work, all views should be self-
maintainable, which is quite easy if we consider that there
are only inserts. According to the work of Levy [20], know-
ing wetter or not a view is adequate (answer complete and
answer correct) can be expressed in terms of ‘query depen-
dency’. This means that all performance issues can be con-
centrated on this topic: how much performance does it take
to check if an incoming tuple touches the view (cf. sec-
tion 3.1.3 in which we described that a tuple must be tested
on true or false at insertion time).
Maintaining multiple views may be very costly in terms of
performance: if n− k tuples are query dependent, the tuple
must be inserted in k separate views generating k I/Os (in-
stead of just one I/O in the original base relation). Further
research must resolve if this really is an issue, and if there
are perhaps solutions in the literature for this. Indeed, the
tuple must be inserted in k separate files, but this does not
necessarily mean that the data is also k times replicated.
In the optimal case, the tuple is split into k distinct parts,
each part inserted into a different file. Dependent on the
organization of the database (see for example MonetDB [5],
in which a storage model based on vertical fragmentation
has been used), this might not be costly at all.
5. FURTHERWORK
The work as presented in this paper is clearly work in progress,
and can be seen as a first step into further research in com-
prehensive retention and collection policies. For example,
in section 2 we specified life cycle policies which support
the degradation of values in multiple steps, given multi-
ple retention periods. Those policies can be specified by
each user individually, making the degradation process user-
oriented instead of application-oriented. In this scenario
users have even more control over what kind of data they
want to provide to application, so that applications have
to negotiate with users. However, individual policies intro-
duce additional difficulties which must be solved. In order
to maximize the performance of our approach, optimization
techniques can be investigated with a comprehensive perfor-
mance study.
As mentioned in section 3.1.3 and 3.1.4, we still need some
access control techniques in order to update the degraded
data set to keep it accurate. Additional research has to be
done to find the best suitable techniques in terms of privacy
protection and performance. One possibility is to slightly re-
lax the adequacy condition in exchange for less access control
and more limited retention techniques.
6. CONCLUSIONS
In our approach, we reuse well known materialized view
techniques with a new purpose: minimizing the amount
of data stored in the system to answer queries to comply
with the limited collection and retention principles. Since
base relations will not be available, those views must be
self-maintainable (or at least with a minimized amount of
additional information needed to update the views), intro-
ducing additional difficulties. However, by clearly commu-
nicating to users which data will be collected and stored
for which period, the asymmetric information difficulties be-
tween donors and collectors of data will be strongly reduced.
Access control methods can still be used to restrict access to
the remaining data, but at times access control is not suffi-
cient to resist against attacks on the database, the amount
of disclosed data and the privacy sensitivity of it at least is
reduced.
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